Water sharing is becoming more irritant in the Indo-Pak relationship.If we see recent history "Indus Water Treaty" water sharing has taken a politically charged form and created conflicts and may even replace Kashmir as the primary source of conflict between India and Pakistan. In recent time Taaliban Mujahiddin also included which tried to bomb a dam. It is thought that the they are encouraged by Iran who are going to suffer from less water due to the so called dam. So It's not only including India and Pakistan but also Iran and in this way the whole south-east Asian region might be having conflicts on water.
India has major network of rivers including three major river system from GangaYamuna, Bramhaputra and Indus which have some or major part in neighbouring countries.
currently four major treaties govern them.
These include the Indus Water Treaty (1960) between India and Pakistan ,
Sankosh Multipurpose Project treaty (1993) between India and Bhutan ,
the Ganges Water Sharing Agreement (1996) between India and Bangladesh ,
and the Mahakali Treaty (1996) between India and Nepal .
Among them The Indus Water Treaty has been always controversial of the rivers distribution and usage and constructing Dams. Indus water treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the Eastern Rivers and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has exclusive use of the Western Rivers. Pakistan also received one-time financial compensation for the loss of water from the Eastern rivers.
Indus Water Treaty also gives India certain rights over the western rivers including domestic use, navigation, limited agriculture use including irrigation over 1.34347 million acres and generation of hydropower. India is also allowed to create storage on western rivers of up to 3.6 million acre feet of storage.
[Sources said that contrary to “the propaganda”, India has not built any storage facility on the western rivers and till 2008/9 has only irrigated 0.7924 million acres. At this point, India has 33 river projects that are completed or in different stages of completion. India plans three power projects in four years. The National Hydel Power Corporation (NHPC) and Jammu and Kashmir’s Power Development Corporation (PDC) have drawn up an ambitious plan to build three projects by 2012 in the power-starved state. Earlier, the PDC had wanted to float global tenders for the project, but now it has been decided to partner with the NHPC, a central government enterprise for development of hydro-electricity, PDC sources said.PDC will also sign a joint venture agreement with the NHPC this month-end for two other projects – Kiru of 600 MW and Karwa of 500 MW. The projects will be executed in the next four years, the sources said. Power Minister Babu Singh said these projects would transform the economic landscape of the state.]
Before understanding the problem lets have a look at brief history.
The Indus River System
The northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent is dominated by the Indus River and its system of upper tributaries (collectively referred to as Indus River System .) Originating 17,000 feet (518 m) above sea level in a spring near Lake Manasarovar at Mt. Kailash, the Indus river along with the Brahmaputra, Sutlej , and Karnali rivers are fed by many tributaries in Tibetan region to become a largest river in that region which passes through Karakoram and Zanskar ranges. The Indus then traverses a distance of 1800 miles (2900 km) through Tibet, India, Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), and Pakistan and meet Arabian Sea south of Karachi. On its way, it become rich with gaining water from many rivers like Beas , Sutlej , Ravi , Chenab and Jhelum. The western tributaries of the Indus are Swat, Kurram, Gomal, Kohat, Zoab and Kabul. The river has been also known as the "Sengge"or "Lion River" by the Tibetans, "Abbasseen" or Father of Rivers by the Pathans of present NWFP Pakistan, and "Mitho Dariyo" or "Sweet River" by the denizens of the arid Sindh.
At the time of Indo-pak division it came to Britishers to harness and efficiently distribute the water of Indus and its tributaries equally and efficiently among both the countries. The Indus Water Treaty then came into agreement between the two countries.
It made distribution of the complex riverine systems of Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra. Of these three rivers, the Indus had a complicated set of issues from thousands of kilometres of man-made irrigation canals and headworks that regulated the flow of its waters. While all the rivers, except Indus and Sutlej , originated within Kashmir , the headworks located mostly in the Eastern Punjab were awarded to India . Aside from the Punjab Boundary Commission suggestion that the canal-headworks system be treated as a joint venture, a proposition rejected by both countries, it had not deliberated water sharing of Indus River Basin due to a hasty partition that was completed in a mere 73 days. Water sharing issues of Indus River System would later take over a decade to resolve. Further complicating this issue, Pakistan covertly and later overtly sought to grab Jammu & Kashmir for various reasons including the desire to control the waters of these rivers that succeeded in instilling only distrust among Indian minds. And Pakistan continuously blamed India for hatching water which was its share, like boundary line made by Radcliff and Mountbatten at the time of the Partition in August 1947, by which the two very important headworks of Madhopur on the Ravi and Ferozpur on the Sutlej were given to India, laid the belief of depriving Pakistan of the water resources that historically and geographically belonged to it.
After the Partition, both the nations agreed to a “Standstill Agreement” on Dec. 30, 1947 freezing the existing water turn systems at the two headworks of Madhopur (on the Ravi ) and Ferozepur (on the Sutlej ) until March, 31, 1948 . Any dispute that could not be resolved by the Punjab Partition Committee was to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) which had been setup under Section Nine of the Indian Independence Act by the Governor General to sort out difficulties arising over the division of assets. However, on the expiry of the arrangement and after not receiving an encouraging response to a reminder for talks issued by the East Punjab Government on 29th March 1948, and in the absence of a new agreement, the then Indian Punjab Government promptly stopped the water supply through Madhopur on April, 1, 1948. By a coincidence, the Arbitral Tribunal’s term also expired on the same day. In the meanwhile, the AT had accepted India ’s claims regarding seigniorage charges for the waters and ordered payment of the same by Pakistan . At the invitation of East Punjab , the Engineers of the two divided-Punjab States met in Simla on Apr. 15, 1948 and signed two Standstill Agreements regarding the Depalpur Canal and Central Bari Doab Canal to be in effect until Oct. 15, 1948 . The West Punjab Government agreed to pay: (1) seigniorage charges, (2) proportionate maintenance costs, and (3) interest on a proportionate amount of capital. In its defence, the GoI cited such charges levied by the Punjab on the Bikaner state under the British.
However, the West Punjab Govt. refused to ratify the Agreement and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, then Liaqat Ali Khan, called for a meeting. The Finance Minister of Pakistan , Ghulam Mohammed, along with the Pakistani Punjab ministers, Shaukat Hayat Khan and Mumtaz Daulatana visited Delhi to work out an agreement in the Inter-Dominion Conference held on May, 3-4, 1948. India agreed to resume release of water from the headworks, but made it clear that Pakistan could not lay claim to these waters as a matter of right and would levy seigniorage charges specified by the Prime Minister of India to be deposited in Reserve Bank of India , establishing Indian sovereignty over these rivers. The Indian side also made assurances that the waters would be diminished slowly giving enough time for West Punjab to develop alternate sources. The West Punjab Government, for its part, also recognized “the natural anxiety of the East Punjab Government to discharge the obligations to develop areas where water is scarce and which were underdeveloped in relation to parts of West Punjab .” Soon the Pakistani Government falsely accused that they were coerced into signing this Agreement and made futile appeals to the Governor General Lord Mountbatten. However, due to the hostilities between India and Pakistan on account of Kashmir and in the general environment of distrust and animosity, no further talks took place. Pakistan ’s suggestion in June 1949 to take the matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and widen the conflict across all rivers, was rejected by India . On November 1, 1949 , Pakistan unilaterally invalidated the Delhi Agreement and by July, 1950 stopped seigniorage payments into RBI. However, India continued to abide by the Agreement and supplied waters.
In 1951, David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and a former Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, USA visited the two countries ostensibly to write a series of articles for the Colliers magazine (since defunct). Having had access to both the Governments at the highest level, Lilientahl wrote in one of his articles, “I proposed that India and Pakistan work out a program jointly to develop and jointly to operate the Indus Basin river system, upon which both nations were dependent for irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries could be made to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food production. In the article I had suggested that the World Bank might use its good offices to bring the parties to agreement, and help in the financing of an Indus Development program.”
Inspired by this idea, Eugene R. Black, then President of the World Bank visited the two countries and proposed a Working Party of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank engineers to tackle the “functional”, rather than the “political” aspects of water sharing. The two countries accepted this mediation (which also had the backing of President Truman who wanted to remove the “kind of unfriendliness” that existed then between the US and India ) offer in March 1952 and sent their technical teams to Washington for further discussions. Subsequent meetings took place in Karachi in Nov., 1952 and New Delhi in Jan. 1953. The World Bank suggested that each side submit its own plans, which they did on Oct. 6, 1953 . The two plans, while concurring on the available supply of water, differed widely on allocations. The table below, shows the initial, negotiated and final positions of both the countries.
Plan | ||
Initial Estimate | 119 MAF | 118 MAF |
Initial Indian | 29 MAF | 90 MAF |
Initial Pakistani | 15.5 MAF | 102.5 MAF |
Revised Indian | All of the Eastern rivers + 7% of Western rivers | None of the Eastern rivers plus 93% of the Western rivers |
Revised Pakistani | 30% of Eastern rivers and none of the Western rivers | 70% of the Eastern rivers + all of the Western rivers |
World Bank | Entire flow of the Eastern Rivers | Entire flow of the Western Rivers |
However, despite all efforts, the wide gaps in the stands of the two countries could not be bridged, mainly due to the intransigence of the Pakistani side as the revised and final allocations show clearly above. The World Bank felt that an ideal approach to joint development of an integrated plan for Indus Basin as proposed by David Lilienthal was now impossible. In order to resolve the dispute, it finally stepped in with its own “settlement” proposals on Feb. 5, 1954 offering the three Eastern rivers to India and the three Western rivers to Pakistan . India accepted the proposal in toto on Mar. 25, 1954 while Pakistan gave only a “qualified acceptance” on July 28, 1954 . The settlement offered by the World Bank was closer to the Indian position as it repudiated the claims of Pakistan based on “historic usage”. An angered Pakistan threatened to withdraw from further negotiations. The World Bank proposal was then transformed from a “settlement” to a “basis for further negotiations” and the talks eventually continued for the next six years. In the meanwhile, the two countries signed an Interim Agreement on June 21, 1955 . As no conclusive agreement could be reached, the World Bank announced on Apr. 30, 1956 that the negotiation deadline has been indefinitely extended. As is its wont, Pakistan , through its then Prime Minister H.S.Suhrawardy, issued a direct threat of war with India over waters, escalating tensions.
Under the World Bank plan, Pakistan was asked to construct barrages and canals to divert the Western river waters to compensate the loss of Eastern rivers on the Pakistani side. During the period needed to do this, called the Transition Period, India was required to maintain the “historic withdrawals” to Pakistan The World Bank then suggested a “financial liability” for India as replacement costs by Pakistan for the loss of the three Eastern rivers. In the 1958 meeting, the replacement works and the financial liability to India were considered.
India rejected Pakistan ’s proposal, known as the “London Plan”, for two large dams on the Jhelum and the Indus and three smaller ones on Ravi and Sutlej and several canals, all in all totaling USD 1.2 Billion. India ’s alternate proposal, known as the “Marhu Tunnel Proposal”, was unacceptable to Pakistan as leaving too much leverage on water flows in Indian hands. In May, 1959, the Bank’s President visited both countries and suggested a way out which involved India paying a fixed amount of £ 62.060 Million to be paid in ten years in equal installments and the Bank assisting Pakistan with help from donor countries. The international consortium of donors pledged USD 900 Million for Pakistan and the drafting of the IWT began in Aug., 1959.
India rejected Pakistan ’s proposal, known as the “London Plan”, for two large dams on the Jhelum and the Indus and three smaller ones on Ravi and Sutlej and several canals, all in all totaling USD 1.2 Billion. India ’s alternate proposal, known as the “Marhu Tunnel Proposal”, was unacceptable to Pakistan as leaving too much leverage on water flows in Indian hands. In May, 1959, the Bank’s President visited both countries and suggested a way out which involved India paying a fixed amount of £ 62.060 Million to be paid in ten years in equal installments and the Bank assisting Pakistan with help from donor countries. The international consortium of donors pledged USD 900 Million for Pakistan and the drafting of the IWT began in Aug., 1959.
The treaty was signed in Karachi by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Field Marshal Ayub Khan H.P., H.J. and Mr. W.A.B. Illif, President of the World Bank in a five-day summit meet starting Sep. 19, 1960 . However, it was deemed effective from Apr. 1, 1960 . The two governments ratified the same in January 1961 by exchanging documents in Delhi . Simultaneously an Indus Basin Development Fund was established with contributions from Australia , Canada , Germany , New Zealand , the UK and the US along with India ’s share of the cost. The Eisenhower Administration contributed roughly half the cost of the Fund, while the World Bank provided US$ 250 Million and the other donor countries together provided a similar amount. The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) of Pakistan was entrusted with the task of completing these tasks. The fund was subsequently extinguished after the completion of the projects.
Many Pakistanis felt that Pakistan surrendered to India the waters of the three Eastern rivers in 1960. Their argument were on the following basis. On the basis of over fifty years' record the mean flow in Indus River System (IRS) totalled 175 MAF on the eve of Partition of Punjab in 1947. This comprised of 93 MAF including 27 of Kabul for Indus, 23 for Jhelum, 26 for Chenab, 6 for Ravi, 13 for Beas and 14 for Sutlej annually. Out of this 175 MAF, 167 flowed into Pakistan at the time the boundaries of partitioned Punjab were fixed according to the Radcliffe Award . This means that the Indian East Punjab drew only 8 MAF of a total of 33 MAF of water that annually flowed in three eastern rivers Ravi , Beas and Sutlej . Under the Internationally agreed rights of lower riparian states and also Indian Independence Act 1947, the balance 25 MAF waters of three eastern rivers were to be shared between India and Pakistan . [12] The Pakistanis feel that those who negotiated the IWT on their behalf did not sufficiently press for the sharing of this quantum of water.
However, there are several fallacies in these arguments. First, leaving the claim on the quantum of waters aside, the arrangement entered into at Partition time was interim in nature until a final agreement could be reached and the provisions of such an interim arrangement were in no way binding on the parties concerned. Secondly, the Indus Agreement was reached eventually in 1960 during that time the utilization of the waters of these rivers had grown enormously in the states of East Punjab , Rajasthan, and Jammu & Kashmir. To claim the waters on the basis of the flow thirteen years before, when agriculture and economy had been dictated by different circumstances of a united India is patently unfair. In fact, the IWT itself treats water flows and usage based on the situation existing as on Apr. 1, 1960 , the effective date of the Treaty. Thirdly, as a lower riparian state, all the unused river waters would naturally flow to Pakistan . This, by itself, cannot bestow any rights on that country and again, a quantum of 80 MAF of water was reaching the Arabian Sea unutilized out of the total flow of the Indus River systems. All these are summarized by the following statement of N.D.Gulhati, the principal negotiator from the Indian side to the IWT, “After ten years of hard and devoted work, we had secured almost a world-wide recognition of our claim to use in India all the waters of the Eastern Rivers, including the 12 MAF which was actually being let down for use in Pakistan as at the time of partition... In India , we had already allocated all these waters, including the 12 MAF referred to above, between Punjab (including the present Haryana), Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir . The scope of the Bhakra-Nangal project had been considerably increased, the Madhopur-Beas Link and the Sirhind Feeder had been completed and opened for operation, several new channels had been built on the Upper Bari Doab Canal and the Rajasthan Canal was under construction." [15]
Issues External to Pakistan
There are lots of factors external to Pakistan that could also affect the Indus River System. One is the climatic changes leading to reduced flows on the Indus per se. Another factor is the growing demand within India, especially the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) where people feel that the IWT has wrongfully deprived them of water resulting retarding the growth of agriculture, power generation, and irrigation from rivers that originate and flow from their very state. There was also a widespread demand within India for abrogation of the IWT after the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 by terrorists supported directly by the Pakistan.
Even after treaty there had been many issues raised from time to time like
The Tulbul Navigation Lock/Wullar Barrage Issue
The 74 Sq. Km. Wullar Lake (original size 202 Sq. Kms.) is the largest freshwater lake in India and is situated on the Jhelum and supplies 40% of J&K’s fish catch. The stretch of 22 Km between Sopore and Baramulla becomes non-navigable during the lean winter season with a water depth of only 2.5 ft. It is only in spring that rainfall causes the snow to melt at higher elevations on the surrounding mountains and causes floods. In order to improve navigation, India started constructing in 1985, a barrage 439 feet long and with a lock, at the mouth of the lake to raise the flow of water in winter to 4000 cusecs with a depth of 4 ft with an added storage of 0.3 MAF. Pakistan objected to this project and construction was halted in 1987. Pakistan’s objection was dur to two issues, one India needs to get concurrence of the design from Pakistan and two, it cannot store waters as per IWT on the Jhelum Main anything in excess of 0.01 MAF as “incidental storage work”. Pakistan ’s real objections may be due to its fear that such a barrage may damage its own Triple-Canal project linking Jhelum and Chenab with the Upper Bari Doab Canal . Pakistan also says that such a barrage would be a security risk enabling the Indian Army to make the crossing of the river either easy or difficult through controlled release of water. India ’s argument is that such a barrage would not reduce the quantum of water flow and it would also be beneficial to Pakistan by regulating water flow to Mangla Dam by controlling floods and also improve the Pakistani Triple-canal irrigation system. The water flow would indeed double during the lean winter period from the current 2000 cusecs. Also, the project does not envisage building any new storage capacity as the Wullar lake already existed and the water is only for non-consumptive use (this term includes such usage as navigation, floating of timber, flood protection or control, and fishing with no diminution in volume of water returned to the river/tributaries after use) which is allowed by the IWT. The Wullar barrage is not a storage project but a control project permissible under the treaty. The two countries had indeed reached an agreement in October, 1991 but then Pakistan suddenly introduced an irrelevant element in February, 1992 by linking the termination of Kishenganga Hydroelectric project with further movements in the Tulbul Navigation Lock project and India ’s refusal stalled further work. The 1991 draft agreement stipulated that India would build a 40-feet wide lock but leave ungated 6.2 Metres of the lake at a crest level of 1574.9 Metres and would also forego 0.30MAF storage while Pakistan would allow the lake to fill to its full capacity at 1578 metres. When the agreement was reached in 1991, the only contention that remained was the timing of the filling up of the lake. The crucial period was between June 21 and August 20 every year. Between October, 1987, and August, 1992, experts from the two countries met eight times to settle the issue. The matter was taken up during the Foreign Secretary-level talks between 1990 and 1994 also. The ninth round was held in July, 2004. Like this many other projects have also raised issues. Some among them settled and some not like.
The Salal Hydroelectric Project
The Ranbir and Pratap Canals
The Kishenganga Project
The Baglihar Project
This project, currently under construction by the Jammu & Kashmir Power Development Corp. on the Chenab in Doda Distt , will generate 450 MW of power when commissioned by end-December, 2005. The contract was extended in 2002 to raise the capacity to 900 MW by Dec., 2007. Pakistan claims that this dam will result in a loss of 7000-8000 cusecs of water a day during the rabi season. India has assured Pakistan that the quantum of water will not be diminished in any way. Pakistan disputes India ’s contention that this is a run-of-river project and the site is unsuitable for an ungated spillway.This project, Pakistan believes, could also lead to inundation of Bajwat Area above Marala headworks due to sudden synchronized releases from Dulhasti, Baglihar and Salal reservoirs on Chenab . Pakistan also claims that India adopted a stonewalling tactics by not allowing the Permanent Indus Commission members of Pakistan from visiting the dam site for four years after having been officially informed of the project in 1998, little recognizing that the 1999 Kargil conflict and the general mobilization of Indian troops as part of Op. Parakram following the Dec. 13, 2001 Parliament attack, both events of Pakistan’s own making, prevented such site visits. In fact, India suspended the site visit on Dec. 24, 2001 following the decision to mobilize troops. Pakistan also contests that it was informed only in 1998 about the Bagilhar project, though the GoI had informed Pakistan as early as 1992. The Pakistani Commissioner of the Permanent Indus Commission had recommended to his government to appoint a neutral expert in Feb. 2003 and accordingly Pakistan claims to have served two notices to GoI in May and November of the same year. Following the February meeting, India allowed a visit by Pakistani experts to the Baglihar project site in October. The Pakistani Commissioner is reported to have made the same recommendation to his Government in January 2004 after another round of PIC meeting. On December 15, 2004 , India supplied Pakistan with more data on the project as a goodwill gesture and rejected Pakistan ’s claims of violation of IWT. However, Pakistan rebuffed India ’s explanations, refused India one week time to study and reply, and decided to discontinue the talks-illustrating Pakistani leadership uncompromising attitude and intransigence. By mid January 2005, Pakistan requested the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert under Article 9(2)(A) of the IWT, claiming one week later that the World Bank chief Mr.Wolfensohn, honored with Pakistan’s highest award of Hilal-e-Pakistan during a visit to that country in early February 2005, had assured Gen. Musharraf that there would be no delay in appointing such an expert. While responding to enquiries from World Bank , India advised the Bank that rather it should allow the suspended bilateral course of action to resume rather than get involved at that stage especially as some convergence of views had appeared in the last round of talks in New Delhi . Meanwhile, Pakistan ’s Minister for Education and former head of the ISI, Javed Ashraf Qazi, warned the Pakistani National Senate that the nation might go to war with India over Baglihar “controversy.”
Embankment on Ravi
Pakistan claims [23] that India has built a 15-Km long embankment (also known as River Training Works, RTWs) on river Ravi in the Narowal sector in 2002, in front of Kot Naina, a village in Shakargarh Distt. Pakistan claims that such a construction “so close to the international border” is violative of both the IWT and the Border Ground Rules, 1961 and has caused flooding on its side. [24] By 2002, Pakistan had also decided to build a similar embankment on its side.
Issues Within Pakistan
The Indus River system, which accounts for 65% of water flow within an arid Pakistan , poses several major challenges to Pakistan today. Pakistan faces both political and non-political problems with respect to The Indus River System.
On the political front, there have been serious differences among the various provinces about sharing of the waters. For example, In Sind, sea water has intruded 54 miles into the Indus river due to low or no flow. On the other way there has been inadequate distribution in various regions like Baloochistan, Punjab, Sindh and river canals according to the agricultural and domestic requirements.It was also decided to set up “Indus River System Authority” (IRSA), as per provisions of the 1991 Accord, with representation from all four provinces. However, actual water allocations have been made on the basis of “historic use” rather than on the 1991 settlement leading to more resentment in Sindh. Here have been widespread protests against the proposed dams of Kalabagh at Mianwali,and Basha at Chilas, Gilgit area and the raising of the Mangla dam in Mirpur. Out of the four provinces of Pakistan , three viz. Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP are against these dams. Even the illegally occupied PoK and Balawaristan oppose the dam projects of Mangla and Basha. The proposed raising of the height of Mangla Dam in Mirpur, PoK, by another 40 feet, will further submerge that district. It is also possible that if India exercises its rights to store 1.5 MAF on Jhelum , the raised Mangla Dam will not fill up. The crux of the matter is the lack of agreement among provinces on the total water availability within the country.
The climatic changes due to global warming have led to depleting flow in all Indus River system of rivers, especially the Indus , which depends on glacial runoffs for 90% of its waters. Generally, the Himalayan rivers also carry a very heavy sediment load especially during summer and rainy season, which in turn leads to river shifting and silting of dams and barrages. The three largest dams in Pakistan , Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma have already lost ~ 25% of their capacity due to silting. This is a serious problem in a country which depends on river irrigation, rather than the monsoon rains, for 74% of its total cultivated land. In addition, there is excessive system-loss of water due to improper and antiquated agricultural techniques and heavy cropping of water-intensive varieties like sugarcane and rice. While reeling under increasing drought for the last six years, it is also predicted that Pakistan will have a certain level of drought conditions for the next 15 years.
Meanwhile, the dwindling flows of water and siltation have led to reduced power generation from the hydroelectric plants that are part of the Indus River System.. There is a real possibility of shutting down power generation permanently at Tarbela, leaving it for irrigation purposes only.
The dams, barrages and canals built to satisfy the increasing demands of water upstream have made water scarce in the Indus at the estuaries of the Arabian Sea causing the sea to push in and increase the salinity in 1.2 Million acres of farmlands. Pakistan also uses the waters of the Indus rivers for another purpose, fortification of its defences along Indian borders. It has built a series of “defence canals” at strategic locations which are flooded at times of wars and tensions to prevent crossing by Indian armour and artillery. In 2002, after India mobilized its forces as part of Operation Parakram , Pakistan diverted waters to these “defence canals” accentuating the then already severe water shortage of 50% to over 70%.
The Indus remains important to both India and Pakistan in another less visible way. The extension of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) beyond the 200 nautical mile (nm) limit from coastal baseline has to be claimed before May, 2009 In places like the sedimentary basin of the Indus river, the sediment thickness of the rivers beyond the foot of the continental slope can be used to establish the outer limit of the continental shelf of a claimant. This requires baseline and bathymetry survey data. A crucial part of the claim is the delineation of the Territorial Sea Baseline (TSB) which is the set of coordinate points that define the line from which the seaward boundaries are to be measured. The continuing Pakistani wrangle with regards to Sir Creek has delayed the compilation and validation of the TSB thereby delaying the computation of the zone boundaries. This is important for India in view of the potential it has for national security, energy prospecting, mining, laying pipelines etc.
Conclusions
Pakistan faces one of the severest water shortages in the world as seen in its’ per capita availability of water per annum fall >80% since1951. Failure to fill the country’s two largest reservoirs to capacity, declining flows in the Indus River System, elusive and contentious the inter-provincial water accord due to mutual suspicions among provinces, and an unsustainable population growth rate of 2% do not bode well for Pakistan’s water situation. Disagreements on construction of new reservoirs, declining groundwater potential, and growing number of disputes with India after a relatively uneventful period of 44 years of water sharing will further complicate matters. In summation, the water situation in Pakistan is truly disastrous in spite of the Indus . Pakistani farmers may be forced to change to higher yielding earlier maturating crops, modify their sowing patterns, and employ micro irrigation in coming years to mitigate shortages-all of which will entail higher costs. Its frivolous objections to Indian projects and a general unwillingness to engage India constructively are partly to force India to amend the IWT to accommodate the increasing demands of water in Pakistan.
Commissioner on Indus Water Treaty Syed Jamaat Ali Shah said
"although the Indus water treat was not a happy marriage but we own this treaty because Tarbela and Mangla Dams were construction under the Indus Water Treaty. He said Indus Water Treaty did not restrict any party regarding number of construction of dams but the thing, needed to be think is that whether negotiations regarding the articles of Indus Water Treaty are according to the wanted spirit of treaty or not otherwise we would have to make think tank. "
According to a Pakistani militant's view it has been INDIA's strategy to deprive Pakistan of its basic needs of water and according to them India is planting WATER BOMB against them and trying to get involved in hydrolic war instead of real nuclear war.
Lt Gen (r) Hameed Gul has said that
India has so far built 62 dams and hydro-electric units on Pakistani rivers to deprive Pakistan of water and render into a desert.
He said Pakistan was being deprived of water under an international conspiracy to conquer it. At this stage, some insane people were opposing construction of Kalabagh Dam in Pakistan. He said that Shaukat Aziz’s influx in Pakistan was also part of the conspiracy as he formulated such policies, which put the country into crisis. Shaukat Aziz created food shortage. He said the mujahideeen damaged Baglihar Dam and it could not be reconstructed.
Hameed Gul, however, warned that the mujahideen would damage all dams. " Blocking of the water of Chenab and Jhelum by this Dam would result in
Denial of water to a vast region, including Multan, Jhang, Faisalabad, Gujrat, Okara, Sahiwal, Vehari, Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur and Rahimyar Khan 406 Canals and 1125 Distributaries will become dry, rendering 35 lakh acres of cultivated land barren, and eventually ruining a total of 70 acres of fertile land.". he added.
Sindh Water Council Chairman Hafiz Zahoor-ul-Hassan Dahr said that when the dispute on water would not be resolved, there would be conflict between the two countries. He said, “India is not building dams under the Indus Water Treaty but on the Pakistani rivers.” He said that the food shortage would be forty per cent next year that would increase starvation in the country. He warned, “Pakistan can become Somalia and Ethopia,” he added.
So currently Pakistan uses its strategy to prove India as a hatcher of its water and using it as a major issue to raise it globally. And it knows that merely occupying rest of Kashmir is not a solution of J&K so it has to be associated with other issues.
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